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Abstract
Self-concept is strongly influenced by beliefs about one’s personal psychological attributes, and
these beliefs are held with varying degrees of confidence and consequence. Hence, it is
investment in self-views of those attributes that helps to regulate and maintain stable selfconcept. Self-view investment is relevant to numerous self-related functions, but high self-view
investment can also contribute to maladaptive self-views. Theory suggests that mindfulness
cultivates a less personal, more objective perception of one’s thoughts, emotions and behaviors,
and training in mindfulness has been shown to alter self-referential processing. The current pilot
study (N=21) investigates the possible role of dispositional mindfulness in two forms of selfview investment, epistemic certainty and emotive importance, as indicated by self-reported and
neural (functional magnetic resonance imaging-based) indicators of investment. Results
indicated that dispositional mindfulness was positively associated with self-reported epistemic
certainty but not emotive importance. Trait mindfulness was associated with activity in the
amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus during judgements of both epistemic certainty and
emotive importance. Caudate activity was positively associated with trait mindfulness
specifically for judgements of emotive importance.
Keywords: self-view, epistemic investment, emotive investment, mindfulness, functional magnetic
resonance imaging
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The Role of Mindfulness in Self-view Investment: Neural and Subjective Indicators
The psychological concept of self is difficult to define (Baumeister, 1991), but most
researchers agree that the self is not a unitary phenomenon. The self is commonly divided into
two broad categories: the experiential self, also called the first-person-self (Libby & Eibach,
2002) and the I-self (James, 1890); and the narrative self (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher & Frith,
2003), also called the third-person-self (Libby & Eibach, 2002) and the me-self (James, 1890).
The experiential self refers to our first-person perception of moment-to-moment events and
enables processes such as a sense of agency and sensory awareness. In contrast, the narrative self
refers to the ‘me’ that is the object of our attention. Rather than being tied to momentary
experiences, the narrative self extends across time, accumulating conceptual knowledge about
the self (Gallagher, 2013). The scope of the narrative self is easily demonstrated through the
practice of self-reflection. Completion of a simple personality assessment (e.g., McCrae & Costa,
1997) will show that most adults can identify their predominant characteristics with high
confidence. In many cases, we have reason for this confidence; either we have obtained
extensive experience confirming these personal tendencies or have friends that have affirmed our
possession of these traits. Notwithstanding the origin or accuracy of our self-views, these selfviews are clearly present, salient, and accessible.
Self-views are imperative to any cognitive functioning that assumes working knowledge
of the self (Neisser, 1997). For example, behavior regulation applies self-knowledge to
determine if a prospective action fits the values and expectations of ‘who you are’ (Spreng, Mar,
& Kim, 2009). You may avoid parties because you see yourself as introverted. When given the
opportunity to cheat, you may balk at the notion because you believe you are honest. When
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offered to work an extra shift you might seize the opportunity because you consider yourself
ambitious or want to avoid appearing lazy. Such examples illustrate the adaptive functioning of
self-views while highlighting their social, moral, and behavioral implications. It should be noted,
however, that self-views are equally implicated in maladaptive functioning. Excessive
preoccupation with self-views is emblematic of fragile self-esteem and narcissism (Campbell,
Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002), and negative self-views are central to affective disorders (e.g.
anxiety and depression) (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins, 2004). Self-views may also harm
interpersonal relations by increasing social anxiety (Mellings & Alden, 2000) or contributing to
group-based biases and aggression when group-level traits are applied to oneself (Inzlicht &
Kang, 2010; Wann, 1993).
The rigidity or flexibility of self-views is largely determined by one’s identification with
such views and is subject to cognitive and affective influence. Self-views are prone to bias for a
myriad of potential reasons, including self-enhancement (Brown, 1986) and self-verification
motives (Swann, 2011). Thus, it is erroneous to assume that self-views are factual or based
purely on evidence. Nevertheless, many of us experience our self-views as the truth about
ourselves, even if other people refute the veracity of our claims. Particularly robust self-views
are often revealed in people’s “self-talk.” For example, someone with poor body image may
persistently think “I am fat” despite being of average size or being told otherwise. In theory,
these fixed self-views are maintained by the “stake” or investment held in such claims (Pelham,
1991). The example above demonstrates that while self-specific beliefs can be cognitively
inferred from objective evidence, it is equally common to believe in a self-view without proof if
one’s emotional and motivational goals are tied to this belief. Hence, self-views are jointly
maintained by cognitive rationales and subjective meaning. Pelham refers to these two concepts
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as epistemic and emotive self-view investment, reflecting the degree of certainty one has in a
self-view, and the importance one places on a self-view, respectively; however, this paper refers
to the two forms of self-view investment as epistemic certainty and emotive importance. The
epistemic certainty and emotive importance of self-views are distinctively relevant to
psychological outcomes, and incipient neuroimaging research on self-views is beginning to
elucidate this unique influence.
Neuroscience of self-views
Over the last two decades, neuroscientific methods have attempted to clarify the nature of
the self by identifying distinct biological substrates of self-related phenomena. An accumulation
of neuroimaging research has examined the neural correlates of ‘self-referential processing,’
defined as the cognitive processing of stimuli that are experienced as being related to or relevant
to oneself (e.g., personality traits). Self-referential tasks recruit activity from various corticalsubcortical midline structures, including the medial orbitofrontal cortex, ventro- and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex, bilateral temporal poles, insula, colliculi, periaqueductal
gray (PAG), and hypothalamus/hypophysis regions (Northoff & Bermphol, 2004; Northoff et al.,
2006). Functional specificity of these cortical-subcortical midline structures (CSMS) has been
extensively studied, and meta-analyses suggest that functional specialization of the CSMS is not
guided by cognitive or perceptual principles, but rather is determined by the meaning of (i.e.,
investment in) self-related stimuli (Northoff et al., 2006). The ventral (BA 10/32) and dorsal (BA
9/32) subdivisions of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) appear to be particularly critical for
encoding the investment quality of self-related stimuli, given that the emotive importance of selfrelated stimuli has been linked to vmPFC engagement and has shown to be inversely related to
dmPFC activation.
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Relative to the dmPFC, the vmPFC is distinguished by its functional connectivity to
subcortical nuclei (Kober et al., 2008) and this connectivity facilitates the generation of affective
meaning (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager 2012), otherwise known as valuation (D’Argembeau, 2013).
In contrast, the dmPFC is ostensibly related to the reappraisal and logical analysis of self-related
stimuli (Flagan & Beer, 2013). This functional specificity of the dmPFC and vmPFC has been
further established by research on the self-evaluation of personal characteristics (i.e., self views)
(Kircher et al., 2000; Kelley et al., 2002; Kjaer, Nowak, & Lou, 2002; Fossati et al., 2004;
Macrae et al., 2008; Schmitz et al., 20004). Although multiple studies have linked dmPFC
activity to certainty of evaluations (Krain et al., 2006; Bhanji et al., 2010; Eldaief et al., 2012)
and vmPFC activity to emotive importance of evaluations (Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Levy &
Glimcher, 2012; Kim & Johnson, 2015; Wlodaski & Dunbar, 2016), only one study to date has
explicitly examined the dissociation of dmPFC and vmPFC activity in relation to the degree of
epistemic and emotive investment in self-views (D’Argembeau et al., 2011). While undergoing
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) participants viewed a series of psychological
traits and were asked to judge: a) how much did this trait describe them; b) how certain they felt
about possessing this trait (i.e., epistemic certainty); and c) how important it was for them to
have (or not have) this trait (i.e., emotive importance). Analyses of the mPFC revealed a dorsalventral functional gradient with dorsal regions relating to epistemic investment and ventral
regions relating to emotive investment. These results suggest that self-views are neurally
represented as a factor of subjective value, with vmPFC activation encoding for the presence of
emotive value. This view has since been formalized as the Valuation Hypothesis (D’Argembeau,
2013), which proposes that the vmPFC plays a crucial role in connecting subjectively important
stimuli to self-representations. Relative to the vmPFC, there is less consensus regarding the
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specific role of the dmPFC, given that dmPFC activity is related to both self- and non-selfrelated processes (van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). It been suggested that
dmPFC engagement may broadly mediate epistemic judgements through derivation of social and
memory-based information (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004). Other researchers advocate
for the dual role of the vmPFC and dmPFC and suggest that simultaneous vmPFC activation and
dmPFC deactivation jointly encode for self-related information with emotional importance
(Northoff et al., 2009). Although further research of mPFC functionality is necessary to resolve
these theoretical discrepancies, it can reasonably be assumed that the vmPFC and dmPFC are
distinctly associated with the generation and maintenance of self-views.
Clinical cases of maladaptive self-views shed light on the role of the mPFC within
broader neural networks. The dmPFC and vmPFC show extensive structural connectivity with
limbic areas (e.g., amygdala, hippocampus, pericarpal cortex) and visceral control areas (e.g.,
hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray area)—regions implicated in evaluative learning—and
irregular activation from mPFC regions has been associated with heightened emotional response
(Sheline et al., 2009) and poor self-regard in major depressive disorder (Lemogne, Delaveau,
Freton, Guionnet, & Fossati, 2012). Moreover, changes in vmPFC engagement have been
associated with reduced endorsement of negative self-views following cognitive behavioral
therapy (Yoshimura et al., 2013). Together, this evidence suggests that modification of vmPFC
activity may underlie changes in self-views via adjustments to emotive investment. However, no
studies have directly questioned if it is possible to adjust emotive (or epistemic) investment in
self-views, and no studies have investigated if these adjustments relate to changes in positive or
negative self-regard.
Mindfulness and self-views
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Maladaptive self-views are resistant to change and standard efforts to correct for biased
and/or harmful self-views – via direct feedback (Vazire, Mehl, & Carlson, 2010) or introspection
(Pronin, 2009) – are often ineffectual. It may be possible to challenge self-views indirectly
through mitigation of self-view investments; however, informational and motivational barriers
may impede the ability to accurately discern the thoughts and feelings responsible for
maintaining self-views (Vazire, 2010). In other words, people typically lack the perspective and
objectivity to recognize their investment in particular self-views. It is plausible, however, that
this limitation can be overcome via the application of mindfulness. Mindfulness is canonically
described as a sustained, receptive attention to and awareness of present moment occurrences
(Brown & Ryan, 2003). By definition, mindfulness is non-judgmental—because it tempers the
evaluation of emotional and other stimuli—and applies to both internal (i.e. within the
individual) and external events. It is hypothesized that mindfulness may overcome informational
and motivational barriers to self-knowledge by improving awareness of thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors while reducing biases due to evaluative judgements (Carlson, 2013). Thus, it is
plausible that mindfulness may foster the non-biased observation of self-views.
Predominant theories of mindfulness suggest that bringing awareness to habitual states
of mind allows one to “decenter” or “de-fuse” from one’s subjective experiences (e.g., Safran
and Segal, 1990; Bernstein et al., 2015; Bernstein, Hadash, & Fresco, 2019; King & Fresco,
2019). As a mechanisms-of-action in mindfulness, decentering has been defined as a mental
phenomenon comprised of three interrelated metacognitive processes: meta-awareness (i.e.,
awareness of the contents of internal events), disidentification from internal experience (i.e,
experiencing internal events as separate from one’s self), and reduced reactivity to thought
content (i.e., reduced impact of internal events on other thought processes) (see Bernstein et al.,
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2015; Metacognitive Process Model of Decentering). Although decentering is a natural
metacognitive capacity, the mind does not necessarily engage in decentering by default. People
can easily lose meta-awareness and become immersed in the contents of consciousness without
awareness of the mental processes that serve as context. This type of “experiential fusion” is
especially common in clinical affective disorders (e.g., depression and anxiety) in which
individuals have difficulty disengaging with negative patterns of thought. Similarly, a lack of
meta-awareness can also promote “cognitive reification”, defined as the “experience of thoughts,
emotions, and perceptions as being accurate depictions of reality” (Dahl, Lutz, & Davidson,
2015). In this way, self-views become subject to cognitive reification when an individual is
unaware of the thoughts and feelings in support of self-views (i.e., self-view investments). For
example, a person may say, “I am stupid” rather than acknowledge that this is (just) a thought
(“There is a thought here of being stupid.”). Mindfulness is thought to foster awareness of such
self-views and possibly disrupt identification with them. Early evidence supports this idea,
showing that maladaptive self-views can be altered as a consequence of mindfulness training
(Farb et al., 2007; Goldin, Ramel, & Gross, 2009; Thurston, Goldin, Heimberg, & Gross, 2017),
and research has supported the role of decentering as a mechanism of mindfulness’ salutary
effects (Shoham et al., 2017).
Neural mechanisms of mindful decentering
Mindfulness practice has been associated with reliable and enduring changes in neural
activity (Holzel et al., 2011), and evidence suggests that mindfulness-related changes in neural
coordination and connectivity correspond with the different metacognitive processes of
decentering (Tang, Holzel, & Posner, 2015; King & Fresco, 2019). Mindfulness has been shown
to increase within-network activity of the salience network (SN), namely the dorsal anterior
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cingulate (dACC), insula, and amygdala (Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall, Duncan, & Barsalou
2012), all associated with directing attention from internal to external stimuli; and the
frontoparietal control network (FPCN, bilateral dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC), and posterior parietal
cortex (PPC)(Allen et al., 2012; Taren et al., 2017), associated with executive functioning
(Baxter & Chiba, 1999). Together, increased coordination of the SN and FPCN networks may
indicate improvements in meta-awareness capacities (King & Fresco, 2019). Mindfulness also
reduces activity and within-network connectivity in the default mode network, including the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and vmPFC, regions that have previously been associated with
narrative self-processing (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Farb et al., 2007). Researchers suggest that
PCC-vmPFC engagement during mind wandering may indicate reflexive identification with
internal experiences (Bernstein et al., 2015). Hence, findings suggest that mindfulness instills
disidentification via reductions in PCC-vmPFC activation. If mindfulness is capable of
modifying investment in (i.e., identification with) self-views, it is probable that such changes are
subserved by PCC-vmPFC activity.
Investigation of self-views in the context of mindfulness has yielded results consistent
with the metacognitive model of decentering. In one fMRI study (Farb et al., 2007), participants
were asked to apply narrative or experiential self-focus while viewing a series of personality
traits. Experiential self-focus refers to the observation of moment-to-moment experiences and is
a construct closely related to meta-awareness. The alternative condition, narrative focus,
instructed participants to evaluate the self-descriptiveness of each personality trait, and is
conceptually similar to the default, narrative mode of self-view investments. As anticipated,
narrative self-focus elicited activity from cortical midline structures, including the mPFC and
PCC. When engaging in experiential self-focus, the mindfulness-trained group demonstrated

13
THE ROLE OF MINDFULNESS IN SELF-VIEW INVESTMENT
reductions in vmPFC and dmPFC activity, suggesting that those trained in mindfulness were able
to disengage from self-view representations associated with narrative self-focus. These results
suggest that meta-awareness imbued by mindfulness subserves experiential self-focus and
potentially undermines habitual representations of self-views.
The impact of mindfulness on maladaptive self-views has been examined in patients with
social anxiety disorder (SAD) (Goldin et al., 2009). Patients who completed mindfulness training
reported greater endorsement of positive personality traits and lower endorsement of negative
traits, and changes in positive self-views were associated with reductions in vmPFC and dmPFC
engagement. Although changes in negative self-views did not correlate with reductions in
cortical midline activity, reductions in negative self-views were associated with greater
recruitment from attentional networks (left inferior parietal lobule and medial precuneus). It is
possible that recruitment from attentional networks is indicative of enhanced attentional
capacities implicit to meta-awareness, and that mindfulness-trained SAD patients were
implementing attentional control to disengage from habitual thought patterns associated with
negative self-views. These study findings partly corroborate the results of Farb and colleagues
(2007), and together, both studies support the crucial role of the vmPFC and dmPFC in narrative
representations of self-views. However, the accumulation of research on mindfulness and selfviews is unclear on the differential function of the vmPFC and dmPFC. It is plausible that
mindfulness modifies self-views via dissociable mechanisms targeting epistemic and emotive
investment in self-views respectively, but this hypothesis requires further investigation.
The present study
The two forms of investment in self-views, epistemic certainty and emotive importance,
are relevant for intrapersonal and interpersonal wellbeing and inform the neurological
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underpinnings of self-representation. There is evidence suggesting that mindfulness can alter
maladaptive self-views via awareness of self-related thoughts and feelings, and prior research
supports that mindfulness targets neurological regions associated with self-view investments
(i.e., vMPFC, dmPFC, and PCC). Together this evidence provides a foundation for the
exploration of mindfulness and its impact on factors that appear to help sustain self-views,
namely, epistemic certainty and emotive importance. The current pilot study had four specific
aims. Aims 1 and 2 examined these factors in terms of behavioral outcomes. Specifically, aim 1
explored the relations of dispositional mindfulness with endorsement of positive and negative
self-views, operationalized as personality traits (e.g., friendly, arrogant, faithful), and aim 2
investigated the relations between dispositional mindfulness and the degree of self-reported
emotive importance and epistemic certainty in positive and negative self-views. Aims 3 and 4
investigated these factors in terms of neurobiological mechanisms. Mindfulness has been shown
to influence neural processes during active judgement of self-views (Farb et al., 2007; Goldin et
al., 2009), and mindfulness-related changes in negative self-views have been linked to off-task,
resting state activity (Vago & David, 2012; Doll, Boucard, Wohlschlager, & Sorg, 2015). Thus,
aim 3 examined whether dispositional mindfulness was related to neural indicators of self-view
epistemic certainty and emotive importance, and aim 4 examined the mediating role of resting
state functional brain activation in the relation between mindfulness and endorsement of negative
traits.
To address these questions, participants first completed a well-validated self-report
measure of dispositional mindfulness. Blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal recordings
were then obtained using whole-brain functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while
participants rated a series of positive and negative personality traits in a self-description task.
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After scanning, participants rated the degree of epistemic certainty and emotive importance in
having or not having each of these personality traits.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 21 healthy, meditation-naive adults recruited from the Richmond,
Virginia area. Participants were excluded if they met any of the following criteria: major
uncorrected sensory impairments or cognitive deficits, pregnancy, left-hand dominance,
diagnosis of medical or psychiatric illness within the last three months, hospitalization within the
last three months, change in medication regiment within last 8 weeks, self-reported current drug
abuse, presence of MRI safety risks (e.g., ferromagnetic implants, body weight > 300 lbs.), or a
history of head trauma or seizures. All participants provided written informed consent to take
part in the study, which was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Virginia
Commonwealth University.
Materials and Methods
Mindful attention awareness scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003)
Trait mindfulness was measured using this 15-item scale assessing receptive attention to,
and awareness of present moment stimuli. Participants rated items on a scale from 1 (“almost
always”) to 6 (“almost never”), with higher scores indicating higher levels of mindfulness.
Dispositional mindfulness was calculated from the average of the 15 items. In previous reports,
the MAAS has shown strong internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and has shown to be
significantly associated with enhanced self-awareness (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Self-description task (D’Argembeau et al., 2012)

16
THE ROLE OF MINDFULNESS IN SELF-VIEW INVESTMENT
In the validated self-description task (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Moran, Macrae,
Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006), participants were instructed to rate a series of personality
traits for self-descriptiveness (To what extent does this trait describe you?), epistemic certainty
(How certain are you that you possess or do not possess this trait?), and emotive importance
(How important is it for you to possess or not possess this trait?) using a Likert-type 4-point
scale (1 = “not at all”; 4 = “very much”). Participants were presented with 40 positive, desirable
traits (e.g., sincere) and 40 negative, undesirable traits (e.g., untrustworthy), balanced for
meaningfulness, word length, and number of syllables (Kim & Johnson, 2014).
Procedure
Pre-scan survey
After providing written informed consent, participants completed a Qualtrics softwarehoused battery of self-report measures including the MAAS. This survey battery was completed
prior to laboratory assessment at the brain imaging facility.
Self-description task (D’Argembeau et al., 2012)
Upon arrival at the brain imaging facility, participants were provided a brief training to
familiarize themselves with the brain imaging procedure and to practice the self-description task.
After orienting to the scanner, participants underwent fMRI and completed an anatomical scan
and a resting state functional scan before completing the self-description task while undergoing
fMRI (and two other, unrelated tasks). In this study the task used 80 adjectives and 20 null
events (fixation cross) presented in random order. Trait adjectives in this study were presented
for 3509 ms and fixation crosses were presented for variable durations (mean duration = 1000
ms). Participants were instructed to indicate how much or how little each trait described them
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using a 4-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very much). This task took approximately 22 minutes to
complete.
Post-scan questionnaire
After task completion in the scanner, participants were escorted to a behavioral
assessment room to complete the post-scan self-description task described above (D’Argembeau
et al., 2011. This second part of the self-description task was completed within 15-30 minutes of
completing the first part of the self-description task in the scanner.
MRI acquisition and preprocessing
Imaging was performed using a 3.0-T Phillips Ingenia MRI scanner. Blood oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) signals were acquired using a T2*-sensitive echoplanar sequence with a
repetition time (TR) = 1000 msec, echo time (TE) = 75 msec, flip angle = 90°, matrix size = 80 x
79, and field of view (FOV) = 240 mm. Each volume contained 36 3.0-mm-thick parallel
transverse slices. Structural scans were acquired using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (1
mm3 isotropic voxel size, TR = 8 msec, TE = 3.7 msec, flip angle = 6°, matrix size = 240 x 256,
FOV = 240 mm) to facilitate registration to native space. Analysis of Functional NeuroImages
(AFNI) software (Cox, 1996; Cox, 2012) was used to conduct all preprocessing and fMRI
analyses. Individual time series datasets were despiked to compensate for motion artifacts,
corrected for head motion (3dvolreg), warped out to common stereotactic reference space
(Montreal Neurological Institute; MNI), and spatially smoothed to uniform 6 mm full-width half
maximum Gaussian kernel.
Statistical Analyses
Behavioral Data Analyses. The current study aimed first to examine the relation of dispositional
mindfulness to the endorsement of positive and negative self-views, operationalized as
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personality traits (e.g., friendly, arrogant, faithful). This first aim was tested by computing
bivariate correlations between trait mindfulness and the average value of self-descriptiveness for
each of positive and negative traits. The variables of interest met the assumption of univariate
normality and were submitted for analysis without pre-treatment.
The second aim of this study was to investigate the relation between dispositional
mindfulness and self-reported epistemic certainty and emotive importance for both positive and
negative self-views. This aim was tested by computing bivariate correlations between trait
mindfulness and 4 different variables: epistemic certainty for negative traits, epistemic certainty
for positive traits, emotive importance for negative traits, and emotive importance for positive
traits. Variables of interest met the normality assumption and were submitted for analysis
without pre-treatment. Bivariate correlations were then calculated between each of these
variables and trait mindfulness.
MRI data analysis. The third aim of this study was to examine whether BOLD responses to
epistemic certainty and emotive importance in self-views varied as a factor of dispositional
mindfulness. Specifically, aim 3 was to examine the neural substrates of mindfulness-related
differences in epistemic certainty and emotive importance operationalized as percent signal
change in volumes of interest (VOIs). To test this aim, fMRI data from the self-description task
was analyzed using a two-level linear modeling approach.
First level (within-participants) analysis
Data were analyzed using GLM as implemented by AFNI’s program, 3dDeconvolve
(Cox, 1996; Cox, 2012). I estimated a GLM that including a regressor for the presentation of
stimuli and realignment parameters to account for any residual movement-related effects.
Contrasts were generated comparing responses to negative versus positive (negative > positive)
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personality traits. In two parallel analyses, adjective-presentation events were amplitude
modulated (AM) using self-reported ratings of epistemic certainty and emotive investment to
model canonical hemodynamic responses at the individual event level. Statistical models coding
for each parametric modulation (epistemic certainty and emotive importance) were constructed
for each participant, linearly registered to native space structural volumes, and then normalized
to MNI stereotaxic space for second-level analysis. Masks were generated for individual time
series using AFNI’s 3dClipLevel program (Cox, 1996; Cox, 2012) with a cutoff value of 40%
intensity. Masks were manually inspected, and cutoff intensity was adjusted as necessary. Masks
were warped into stereotaxic MNI space to constrain illuminated voxels exclusively to brain
tissue in second level analyses.
Second level (between-participants) analysis
Groupmaps were calculated in AFNI using 3dMEMA (Cox, 1996; Cox, 2012), a program
that incorporates within-subject and cross-subject variability, and here with mindfulness entered
as an individual difference regressor. To examine regional activation related to judgement of
negative versus positive traits, group analyses were performed on individual contrasts (negative
> positive) and submitted to paired t-tests with participant identification (ID) numbers entered as
a random effect. To assess the relation between mindfulness and epistemic certainty and emotive
importance, group analyses were performed on individual amplitude-modulated images and
submitted to paired t-tests, again with participant IDs entered as a random effect. Region
activation and statistical power was estimated using AFNI’s AlphaSim (Cox, 1996; Cox, 2012),
a program which implements Monte Carlo simulations to calculate individual voxel probability
thresholding and minimum cluster size thresholding. Activations in groupwise maps were

20
THE ROLE OF MINDFULNESS IN SELF-VIEW INVESTMENT
reported at the maxima of activated voxel clusters, with uncorrected p < .001 and FDR-corrected
p < .05.
Volume of interest (VOI) analyses
To test aim 3, volumes of interest were selected based on previously reported associations
with self-view investment (D’Argembeau, et al., 2011). Masks were generated for individual
amplitude-modulated time series using a 3mm spheric voxel corresponding to activation maxima
of the dorsal mPFC (MNI -6, 55, 22), ventral PFC (MNI 6, 48, -6), left middle temporal gyrus (56, -16, -16), right insula (40, -12, 6), and the right inferior parietal lobe (MNI 52, -52, 34). Beta
weights (standardized regression coefficients) indicating percent signal change in each region
were correlated with trait mindfulness scores and epistemic certainty and emotive importance
ratings for negative and positive traits.
Functional Connectivity Analyses
To test aim 4, a functional connectivity analysis of default mode resting state activity was
conducted. The vmPFC seed region (-2, 50, -6) was selected from the meta-analytical maxima
for the term “default mode” from open source platform, neurosynth.org (Yarkoni et al., 2011).
First, functional connectivity maps were generated between the seed region and all other brain
voxels. Then, interregional (ROI-ROI) correlations for each participant were computed using the
vmPFC seed region and PCC target (0, -50, 27).
Results
Behavioral Results
To test aim 1 of the thesis, bivariate correlations were computed to examine the relation
between mindfulness and endorsement of negative and positive personality traits (see Table 1).
Results revealed no relation between mindfulness and endorsement for negative or positive traits.
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Bivariate correlations were then computed to examine the relation between mindfulness and
epistemic certainty and emotive importance in self-views. Results indicated that mindfulness was
not significantly associated with emotive importance; however, mindfulness was significantly
related to epistemic certainty of one’s self-views, r(19) = .65, p < .001.
To test aim 2, four values were calculated to measure degree of epistemic certainty and
emotive importance in negative and positive views. Bivariate correlations between these values
and trait mindfulness revealed that mindfulness was positively associated with epistemic
certainty in positive, r(19) = .675, p <.01, and negative traits, r(19) = .649, p < .001. Mindfulness
was not related to self-reported emotive importance for either positive or negative traits. Figures
1 and 2 illustrate the relation between mindfulness, epistemic certainty, and emotive importance
for negative traits and positive traits, respectively.
Table 1.
Bivariate correlations between mindfulness, endorsement of negative traits and
positive traits, and ratings of certainty (epistemic investment) and importance
(emotive investment)
1

2

3

4

1. MAAS
2. Negative Traits

-.248

3. Positive Traits

.387

-.687**

4. Certainty

.651**

-.271

.527*

5. Importance

.250

-.023

.519*

.288

1

2

3

4

1. MAAS
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2. Certainty of Negative
Traits
3. Certainty of Positive
traits
4. Importance of Negative
Traits
5. Importance of Positive
Traits
* P <.01

.675**
.649**

.817**

.270

.247

.254

.211

.213

.498*

.495*

** P <.001
Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale.

Figure 1.
Results of bivariate correlations between mindfulness and epistemic certainty and emotive
importance in negative self-views. 3D plot rotation is available at https://plot.ly/~rahrighm/5/

Figure 2.
Results of bivariate correlations between mindfulness and epistemic certainty and emotive
importance in positive self-views. 3D plot rotation is available at https://plot.ly/~rahrighm/7/
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Neuroimaging Results
Aim 3 of the thesis examined BOLD responses for epistemic certainty or emotive
importance in self-views in relation to dispositional mindfulness. Whole-brain group-wise
regression of amplitude-modulated adjective trait events revealed no regional activation
differences in terms of epistemic certainty or emotive investment (see Figure 3). Full results are
reported in Table 2.
Table 2.
Brain regions significantly related to judgements of both epistemic certainty and emotive
investment. FDR corrected p < .05
MNI Coordinates
Brain Region

x

y

z

t-score

P-value

Thalamus

-13

-19

12

3.96

<.05
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Anterior Cingulate

-13

13

44

3.96

< .05

Ventral striatum

18

12

-1

4.85

<.05

Orbitofrontal
cortex
Cuneus

-26

23

-15

3.96

<.05

0

-84

28

4.85

<.05

Medial prefrontal
cortex
Insula

-5

57

33

6.17

<.05

42

-2

-3

3.96

<.05

Figure 3.
BOLD signal responses to adjective traits amplitude-modulated according to self-reported epistemic
certainty (top panel) and self-reported emotive importance (bottom panel).
Displayed at FDR adjusted p < .05

Trials of adjective traits amplitude-modulated by epistemic certainty

Z=8

X=1

Y=-15

Trials of adjective-traits amplitude-modulated by emotive importance

Z=8

X=1

Y=-15
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Whole-brain groupwise regression of negative trait adjective versus positive trait
adjective events (negative > positive) revealed deactivation localized at the midcingulate cortex
(MCC) (peak t = 3.90, p < .10-3, peak MNI = 1, -17, 42; see Figure 4). To further examine the
source of this contrast, beta weights of activation for negative and positive trait adjective events
were examined singly to determine their likely contribution to contrast-elicited deactivation.
Results suggested that midline deactivation by the negative > positive contrast was determined
by trials containing negative traits, with peak deactivations localized within the precuneus (peak t
= 3.88, p < .001, peak MNI = -8, -36, 49) and the posterior insula (peak t = 3.88, p < .001, peak
MNI = 38, -17, 8). Trials containing positive traits did not elicit greater activations from these
regions, however judgement of positive traits was associated with greater activation of the right
caudate (peak t = 3.87, p <.001, peak MNI 14, 10, 8).
Figure 4.
BOLD signal deactivation evoked by negative vs positive adjective traits. Displayed at
uncorrected p < .1-4
Adjective Traits (Negative>Positive)

X=-1.5
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After determining group-wise regional associations of epistemic certainty and emotive
importance, I next examined if trait mindfulness contributed to differences in region-specific
activation. To specifically address aim 3, mindfulness was modeled as a covariate in two parallel
whole-brain regressions of the amplitude-modulated adjective trait events. The model indicated
that trait mindfulness was positively related to activity in the amygdala (peak t = 4.23,
uncorrected p < .001, MNI x = 33, y = 0, z = -24) and parahippocampal gyrus (peak t = 4.36,
uncorrected p < .001, MNI x = -18, y = -49, z = -24) during judgements of epistemic certainty
(see Figure 5), and emotive importance (see Figure 6). Trait mindfulness was positively related
to activity in the caudate (peak t =4.27, uncorrected p < .001, MNI x = 35, y = -17, z = 0) only
for judgements of emotive importance (See Figure 6).

Figure 5.
Mindfulness-related activation to epistemic certainty of self-views.
Displayed at uncorrected p < .001.

Amygdala

X=32

Y=0

Parahippocampal
gyrus

Z=-5
Y=52
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Figure 6.
Mindfulness-related activation to emotive importance of self-views.
Displayed at uncorrected p < .001.

Caudate

Z=0

Y=-17

Amygdala
Y=1

X=30

Parahippocampal
gyrus

Y=37

Z=-7

Voxel of Interest (VOI) analyses
In addition to whole-brain regressions, I addressed aim 3 by restricting analyses to
regions previously implicated in self-view investment. VOI analyses were conducted to
investigate the relation between mindfulness-related BOLD signal activations elicited by
epistemic and emotive self-view investments. Bivariate correlations between trait mindfulness,
epistemic certainty and emotive importance ratings, and beta (standardized regression)
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coefficients of VOIs revealed that trait mindfulness was not significantly correlated with
activation in regions related to epistemic investment; however, trait mindfulness was positively
associated with activation in the left middle temporal gyrus during judgements of emotive
importance, r = .56, p < .001 (see Figure 8). All zero-order correlations between certaintymodulated VOIs and importance-modulated VOIs are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
Table 3.
Zero-order correlations between mindfulness, ratings of negative traits and positive traits, and
certainty-modulated VOIs
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. MAAS
2. Negative traits

.675**

3. Positive traits

.649**

.817**

4. Dorsal mPFC

-.309

-.436

-.427

5. Ventral mPFC

.149

.456*

.287

-.765**

6. Left middle
temporal gyrus
7. Right insula

-.131

-.326

-.246

.908**

-.854

.273

.513*

.468*

-.791

.936**

-.828**

8. Right inferior
parietal lobule
* P < .05

.098

-.061

-.266

.123

-.042

.051

-.174

** P < .001
Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale.
Table 4.
Zero-order correlations between mindfulness, ratings of negative traits and positive traits, and
importance-modulated VOIs
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. MAAS
2. Negative traits

.27

3. Positive traits

.211

.495*

4. Dorsal mPFC

.011

-.451*

-.247

5. Ventral mPFC

.126

.527*

.136

-.269

6. Left middle
temporal gyrus
7. Right insula

.561**

.371

.376

.203

-.278

.369

.464*

.414

-.452*

-.068

.304

8. Right inferior
parietal lobule
* P < .05

.184

-.126

-.363

.249

.356

.01

** P < .001
Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale.
Figure 7.

Trait Mindfulness Score

Correlation between trait mindfulness and left middle temporal gyrus
activity during judgements of emotive importance of self-views

Left middle temporal gyrus % Signal Change

-.329
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Functional Connectivity Analysis
The fourth aim of the study was to examine whether resting state connectivity of the
vmPFC seed with the PCC would mediate the effect of mindfulness on endorsement of negative
personality traits. Preliminary analyses demonstrated that mindfulness was negatively correlated
with endorsement of negative traits (r = -.25, p = .12) and resting state functional connectivity
between the vmPFC and PCC (r = -.21, p = .37). However, vmPFC-PCC functional connectivity
was not correlated with endorsement of negative traits (r = .56, p = .82). Given that the mediator
(vmPFC-PCC connectivity) was not related to the outcome (endorsement of negative traits), the
variables did not meet criteria for a mediation relationship (Baron & Kenny, 1986), so no
mediation analysis was performed.
Discussion
The self-concept is sustained by both cognitive and affective factors (Pelham, 1991), and
these factors have previously been associated with activation from cortical-subcortical midline
structures (CSMS) (Roy et al., 2012; D’Argembeau, 2013). Maladaptive self-views are
characterized by identification with negative traits, but it is possible that the metacognitive
distancing fostered by mindfulness may mitigate maladaptive self-views by altering epistemic
and emotive investment in personality traits. The present exploratory study investigated the
relation between trait mindfulness and self-views in healthy, meditation naïve adults. I examined
whether a basic form of trait mindfulness was related to self-descriptions of negative and positive
traits, and epistemic certainty or emotive importance in self-views, as indexed by self-reported
responses. I also examined BOLD signal recordings obtained during a self-description task to
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determine if dispositional mindfulness was related to neural indicators of epistemic or emotive
investment.
Addressing the first aim of the thesis, the relations between mindfulness and selfdescriptions of personality traits were statistically nonsignificant (ps > .05). Concerning the
second aim of the thesis, namely examining the relations between mindfulness and emotive
importance and epistemic certainty for both negative and positive traits, results revealed large
effect-sized associations between mindfulness and epistemic certainty in both positive and
negative self-views. The magnitude of the two correlations were very similar, suggesting that
mindfulness-related certainty applied equally to both negative and positive personality traits.
Although the findings are preliminary, these findings suggest that mindfulness may improve
non-biased awareness of self-views.
Neuroimaging analyses first examined neural indicators of epistemic and emotive
investment in negative and positive self-views before analyzing mindfulness-related differences
specific to aim 3. Neuroimaging results demonstrated that judgements of epistemic certainty and
emotive importance for a series of personality traits elicited activation from cortical-subcortical
midline regions (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, striatum, and thalamus).
Of particular interest to the third aim of this thesis, dispositional mindfulness was related to
investment-specific differences in activation, with those scoring higher in mindfulness eliciting
activation from the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus when encoding for epistemic certainty
and emotive importance. This pattern may indicate that those scoring higher in mindfulness are
more likely to engage limbic regions when encoding epistemic certainty or emotive importance
for self-views. Such interpretation possibly suggests that mindfulness support semantic
knowledge of the self via viscero-somatic awareness (as opposed to strictly cognitive processes).
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Results also indicated that mindfulness was related to greater caudate activation during
judgements of emotive importance, but not epistemic certainty. These findings, particularly
concerning caudate and amygdala activation, suggest that those scoring higher in mindfulness
recruit from reward associated regions when considering the emotive importance of self-views.
Such an explanation may elucidate the finding showing associations between mindfulness and
positive self-concept (high endorsement of positive self-views and low endorsement of negative
self-views) and is consistent with research linking mindfulness to relatively high self-esteem
(Thompson & Waltz, 2008).
Previous research on self-view investment has shown epistemic investment to be
specifically related to the dorsal mPFC and left temporal gyrus, and emotive investment to be
specifically related to the ventral mPFC, right insula, and right inferior parietal lobe
(D’Argembeau et al., 2011). In specifically addressing the third aim of the study, I conducted
VOI analyses to examine if mindfulness was associated with epistemic or emotive investment in
these regions. Results showed that mindfulness was significantly associated with left middle
temporal gyrus activity when encoding for emotive importance, but not epistemic certainty of
self-views. This result is interesting considering that the left middle temporal gyrus has
previously been associated with certainty of self-views (D’Argembeau et al., 2011). One
explanation for this finding is that those higher in mindfulness made judgements of valuation by
recruiting from regions typically utilized for cognitive judgements. The left middle temporal
gyrus has previously been implicated in social processing and mentalization (Ross & Olson,
2010). Thus, it is possible that those higher in mindfulness were employing a form of cognitive
distancing when evaluating important self-views, as represented via activation from the left
middle temporal gyrus. Further investigation of this region is necessary to make stronger
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conclusions regarding its role in representing self-views and determine if it is a possible target of
mindfulness.
Judgements of negative personality traits elicited significant deactivation from the
midcingulate cortex. Previous research has suggested that dysphoric emotions may divert activity
from the salience network and increase blood flow to the medial prefrontal cortex (Liotti,
Mayberg, McGinnis, Brannan, Jerabek, 2002), but researchers note that this response is
indicative of poor meta-cognitive awareness of emotion (Fresco, Segal, Buis, Kennedy, 2007).
Research indicates that mindfulness may ameliorate symptoms of depression by improving metacognitive awareness of unpleasant emotions via insular activation (Farb et al., 2010). The
findings here suggest that participants responded to negative self-views as if they were
responding to unpleasant emotions. Because those higher in trait mindfulness demonstrated
greater certainty of possessing or not possessing negative self-views, it is possible that
mindfulness reduces cognitive processing that would have otherwise been allocated to emotional
appraisal.
Aim 4 of the thesis was to examine whether resting state connectivity of the vmPFC seed
with the PCC mediated the relation between mindfulness and endorsement of negative
personality traits. The vmPFC seed region and PCC mask were selected a priori based on
research identifying the vmPFC and PCC as central hubs of the default mode network (Davey,
Pujol, & Harrison, 2016) and research linking PCC-vmPFC connectivity to rumination behaviors
(Hamilton, Farmer, Fogelman, & Gotlib, 2015); since vmPFC–PCC connectivity was not
significantly related to negative personality trait endorsement, mediation analysis was not
performed.
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The failure to observe a relation between resting state connectivity and negative selfviews may be due to the sample demographics, which included healthy adults without clinical
levels of anxiety or depression. Future research in populations with internalizing disorders may
determine if mindfulness improves maladaptive self-views via changes in resting state functional
connectivity. In summary, further research is necessary to determine the contribution of the
unique role of default mode network connectivity in valuation of positive and negative selfviews.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study was limited by its small sample size, making statistical significance of the
relations explored more difficult to achieve. However, this exploratory study provides
preliminary evidence suggesting the impact of mindfulness on maladaptive self-views via
mechanisms of affective and cognitive processing. Additionally, I chose to operationalize
mindfulness using a validated self-report scale of dispositional mindfulness (Brown & Ryan,
2003). Trait mindfulness has been related to greater self-awareness and improvements in
emotional and cognitive functioning (Brown & Ryan, 2003), however, a one-occasion self-report
measure lacks the predictive power of experimentally manipulating mindfulness via mindfulness
training. To make stronger conclusions, future research should use randomized control trial
designs to experimentally test the effects of mindfulness training on subjective and neural indices
of self-view endorsement and investment. Prior research has established the ameliorative impact
of mindfulness training on maladaptive self-views (Farb et al., 2007; Goldin et al., 2009), so it is
possible that mindfulness treatment may be leveraged to better understand self-view-related
neural mechanisms associated with internalizing and other disorders.
Conclusion
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Mindfulness is theorized to improve maladaptive self-views via disidentification with
thoughts and feelings. Previous research shows that mindfulness training mitigates negative selfviews by fostering meta-cognitive awareness, however this is the first study to investigate how
mindfulness relates to epistemic and emotive investment in positive and negative self-views.
This research provides preliminary evidence that mindfulness may influence self-views via
differences in self-reported epistemic certainty and emotive importance. These findings provide a
starting point to further examine how beliefs about one’s traits are modulated by mindfulness
training.
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